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RESUMEN
Este articulo realiza el primer intento sistema´tico de analizar cuantitativa-
mente la evolucio´n del mercado de la vivienda en Espan˜a desde 1904 a 1934,
un periodo donde se experimentaron cambios drama´ticos en la demanda de
vivienda como consecuencia del notable crecimiento econo´mico y demogra´fico.
Para realizar este nuevo ana´lisis, los autores han reunido una nueva base
de datos con informacio´n procedente de los anuarios de los registradores de la
propiedad. Adema´s han construido un nuevo ı´ndice de precios hedo´nicos
de la vivienda para el conjunto del paı´s y sus provincias. De manera sor-
prendente, la nueva evidencia indica que los precios reales de la vivienda
aumentaron solo ligeramente durante el periodo y que, en consecuencia, la
oferta de vivienda respondio´ de manera efectiva a la nueva demanda.
Palabras Clave: Regulacio´n de la vivienda, Precios hedo´nicos,
Urbanizacio´n.
1. INTRODUCTION
Housing markets play a central role in the process of economic develop-
ment, especially in periods of rapid demographic and structural change in a
developing economy. Unfortunately, the systematic analysis of the evolution
of housing markets and prices has not been very common in economic
history1. This negligence is even more surprising if one takes into account
that during most of contemporary history the major part of private invest-
ment was devoted to housing, and residential buildings were the main
component of capital stock (Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s 2009)2.
One of the most interesting periods in the history of housing in Spain is
that between 1904 and 1934. During these thirty years, housing markets were
subject to a substantial demand shift and several unexpected shocks3.
1 A notable exception is Williamson (1990, 1994) for the period of the English Industrial
Revolution, and the substantial literature on racial housing discrimination in the United States
(see, e.g. Collins and Margo 2003).
2 The scarce literature is mainly devoted to the period from 1840 to 1890, when the liberal-
isation of housing markets took place and urbanisation accelerated with the destruction of the
walls. See, for example, Ayllo´n et al. (1989), Galiana and Llop (1989), Garcı´a Delgado (1992) and
Rodrı´guez Chumillas (1989).
3 There are several alternative models that explain the basics behind the demand for housing.
However, there is a certain agreement in the literature that demand for housing is a positive
function of income, demographic growth (particularly migrations and the creation of new families)
and the access to mortgages and a negative function of the user cost of capital (interest rates) and
unemployment rates. Similarly, the literature agrees that the supply of housing is a function of the
cost of construction, land prices and interest rates. Obviously, the relation between supply and
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Domestic migration increased without precedent and many people moved
from the countryside to cities and from agrarian to industrialising provinces
(Silvestre 2005). Regional income inequality increased rapidly and peaked
in the first third of the 20th century (Rose´s et al. 2010). Simultaneously,
demographic transition took place, leading to an unprecedented rise in the
number of new families (Pe´rez Moreda 1985). Spain’s financial system also
suffered major transformations as banking, financial intermediation and the
volume of credits expanded (Martı´n Acen˜a 1985). As a consequence of this
series of far-reaching changes, urbanisation rates rose (Reher 1986) and the
housing supply increased substantially (Prados de la Escosura 2003; Tafunell
2005)4. Despite these major developments, housing regulation remained
minimal and public authorities hardly intervened in housing and urban land
markets (Bassols 1973).
How did housing markets react to these major economic and social
transformations? What institutional structures determined the response of
the market to these transformations? How many houses were traded? What
happened to housing prices? Did urban property prices shoot through the
roof as demand increased? These questions are central not only to our under-
standing of Spanish housing markets, but also to our comprehension of the
evolution of the Spanish economy during this period. The economic costs of
any failure in housing markets would have been enormous due to the fact that
Spain was a developing country and housing investment represented a large
share of total investment during the first third of the 20th century.
Fortunately, we have an extraordinary and underutilised source which
collects detailed housing price information for all Spanish provinces: the
Registrar’s Yearbooks (Direccio´n del Registro de la Propiedad y del Notariado).
Information is of rare quality since price underreporting could be considered
minimal, at least, during the period previous to the Civil War (Carmona and
Rose´s 2012). This source contains information not only on the number
and value of houses sold but also on the number and value of mortgages and
other similar financial instruments, as well as the value and number of
houses inherited.
In this paper, therefore, our main objective is to establish the basic
knowledge on the evolution of urban real estate markets, that is, information
on the institutional infrastructure of the markets, transaction volumes and
prices of urban non-farm property in Spain5. Specifically, in the following
(F’note continued)
demand is mediated by institutional factors (mainly zoning regulations) and the availability of land
(geography). For a good review of the literature, see Malpezzi (1999).
4 Sparse evidence on licenses for new houses also underlined the rapid increase in new con-
structions. See, Ferna´ndez Clemente and Forcadell (1992) on Zaragoza, Sorribes (1992) on Valencia
and Tafunell (1992) on Barcelona.
5 To be clearer, here we only consider the outcome (equilibrium) of the basic model of housing
(see previous footnote 3) and the institutional determinants of the market. Therefore, we leave for
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section we review the institutional structure of Spanish housing markets.
We then construct a new series of housing transactions. Finally, we calculate
average housing prices, more specifically, quality- and inflation-adjusted
real urban non-farm property price series for Spain, its macro-regions and
its largest provinces (measured by population). The main result of the paper
is the evidence of a surprising long-run stability of both inflation- and
quality-adjusted house prices in a period of structural change and constant
fluctuations in the macroeconomic environment.
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SPANISH
HOUSING MARKET
Before we investigate the Spanish housing market, we have to consider
that markets do not develop in isolation. Their institutional framework must
be sufficiently developed to allow for the construction of new dwellings and
the transfer of real estate among economic agents. As the reader may observe
over the following pages, the main role of the government in housing
markets during the period under study was to enforce property rights while
its direct market participation was very limited and circumstantial. In other
words, Spanish housing policy was more liberal than interventionist,
although some measures in this direction were timorously implemented.
To enhance efficiency in housing markets, contract law and land use
regulation6 should fulfil a list of requirements7. In particular, property rights
should be transparent, enforceable, emanate from a social consensus and
participants should agree on the final arbiter of disputes (Malpezzi 1999).
Regarding housing transactions, property rights should be easily and fully
transferrable from seller to purchaser (Jaffe and Louziotis 1996). In the case
of tenancy markets, tenant and landlord rights must be well-defined; there
must be clear remedies for violation by either party; rights and obligations
should be freely negotiated representing the outcome of a competitive
market process (Malpezzi 1999). Also, the possibility and causes of eviction
in the rental market should be clearly enumerated (Jimenez 1984). Finally, to
facilitate the external finance of housing transactions, laws should allow the
(F’note continued)
further research a more detailed analysis of the determinants of housing supply and demand and the
corresponding elasticities.
6 According to Malpezzi (1999), contract law is that body of law which regulates the formation
and enforcement of contracts. Specifically, in the case of real estate, it deals with the transfer and
allocation of property and property rights, and disputes on those rights. Land use regulation
comprises the body of formal (law, regulations) and informal (custom) rules that governs the use of
those rights. These regulations generate several different instruments like zoning ordinances, sub-
division regulations, building and housing codes, and private deed restrictions.
7 See, for example, Alchian and Demsetz (1973), Coase (1960), Demsetz (1967) and Williamson
(1975); and the survey of Malpezzi (1999).
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possibility of foreclosure for the non-payment of debt or other violation of
the obligations of ownership (Malpezzi 1999).
The initial pillar for developing enforceable and transparent property
rights is the creation of a system for formal registration of real estate prop-
erty. The traditional system of backing real estate property in Spain had been
based on a network of notaries since the 13th century. The notary verified
the property rights, drafted the legal sales contract and deed. However, the
system was expensive, not perfectly transparent and highly decentralised.
Furthermore, information regarding ownership was sometimes imperfect.
To increase the efficiency of registration, the Bourbons created a govern-
ment-sponsored system of mortgage registry (the Contadurı´a de Hipotecas) in
1768 (Peset 1978, p. 699). The new system of registration was cheap and
therefore reduced information and transaction costs, but it was not universal
or even widely used. Finally, in 1865, the old local system of ownership
registration was replaced by a two-step system of registry, which solved
disputes about property rights and gave legal backup to any transaction
(Carmona and Rose´s 2012) and was similar to the French system8. This
institutional setting was characterised by a network of notaries with a local
monopoly in registering real estate transactions. The parties, commonly the
buyer, sent the records to the Real Estate Register, which collected the stamp
duty on behalf of the government. This institution offered a cheap, universal
and homogeneous system of public registry for all properties, even those not
sold (Bono 1979).
In Spain, as in many European countries, the Liberal reforms in the first
half of the 19th century eliminated restrictions on real estate sales and
established freedom of contract. The new authorities also derogated the legal
apparatus of the Old Regime which allowed the coexistence of different
property rights over real estate, the remaining feudal rights and many of the
old forms of housing tenancy. However, Spanish law did not allow owner-
ship of land to be held separately from the ownership of rights over that land,
and in consequence, all floors of any building and its land were required to
have only one owner. Indeed, this created a pecuniary entry barrier to the
housing property for urban workers since, typically, houses in cities had
several floors and, hence, their price was quite high. As a result, a large rental
market was generated. This legal framework that linked land and housing
property was in force until the end of the period under study9.
Another main contribution of the Liberal Revolution to the construction
of the modern housing market was the Residential Tenancies Act10. This law
8 On the French system, see Gourie´roux and Laferre`re (2009).
9 The requirement of joint ownership of land and the entirety of all buildings on it was
reformed by Royal Order of 26 October 1939, which reformed article 396 of the Civil Code and the
8th article of the Mortgage Act.
10 Royal Order of 9 April 1842, which updates the law of 8 June 1813.
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fully liberalised the lease contract which had no restrictions on price and
duration (Martı´nez Alcubilla 1892-1894). Eviction of renters only required
40 days’ notice, and when the house was sold to a third party the leasing
contract could be cancelled without compensation (Martı´nez Alcubilla
1892-1894, p. 696). The Residential Tenancies Act was criticised for giving
too much power to landlords and not protecting the poor, with the logical
consequence of a growing demand for rent control (Ortego 2006). Several
proposals regarding rent control were approved by the Parliament but their
effective application was limited (Bassols 1973, p. 230). In particular, high
inflation rates prevalent during World War I (rents doubled in
5 years) led to a new regulation (Royal Decree of 21 June 1920) which restricted
rent increases and established special boards to revise evictions (Martı´nez
Alcubilla, Appendix 1921, ECR 419)11. However, this regulation was not
enforced and rents continued rising (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 1929, p. 168).
In sharp contrast with the regulation affecting ownership registry, real
estate transference and renting markets, the regulation of land use changed
substantially from the Liberal Revolution to the Civil War (i.e. from mid-
19th century to 1936). Modifications of this regulation were generated by
demands from two groups with, apparently, contradictory interests. On the
one hand, landlords and developers criticised the absence of land for new
houses and, on the other hand, social reformers and labor organisations
complained about the lack of affordable housing for poor workers and poor
hygiene conditions in crowded cities. Several studies in different periods
(Comisio´n de Reformas Sociales 1985; Hauser 1902; Instituto de reformas
sociales 1920, 1921; Ayuntamiento de Madrid 1929) complained about high
rents, poor housing quality and sanitation conditions in Spain’s urban areas.
In particular, these studies censured the presence of dwellings in basements,
dark houses, houses and rooms shared by different families, sublet renting,
and warm beds. They proposed two types of reforms: the possibility of
limiting rents, which was not implemented (as explained above), and different
measures for increasing the supply of land available for new houses in the
growing cities (Academia de Ciencias Morales y Polı´ticas 1861).
The first zoning measure approved by the Spanish government was the
plan for the development of Madrid and Barcelona (the Plan del Ensanche de
Madrid y Barcelona), the largest and the fastest-growing cities in Spain in
1864. The main objectives of the plan were to regulate the characteristics of
houses and to promote the rapid construction of new houses in order to
respond to the growing demand for accommodation (Bassols 1973, pp. 252-257).
The law established legal mechanisms and institutions (urbanisation committees)
to coordinate the establishment and financing of the necessary infrastructure
for the new urbanisation. The committees benefited from expropriations and
11 Note that these increases were well below the growth of the consumer price index, which
more than doubled from 1914 to 1920 (see the data in Prados de la Escosura 2003).
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received government subsidies through tax exemptions (Bassols 1973). This
model facilitated urban development but had the disadvantage of being
inflexible. The plan was not adjusted to urban changes, which soon rendered
it obsolete, and did not offer enough fiscal revenues to finance urban
expansion and the concomitant increase in infrastructures. During the last
quarter of the 19th century, successive laws were passed in attempts to solve
both problems (1876, 1892) and also created development plans for other
major Spanish cities such as Bilbao and Valencia. The successive reforms of
the plan forced the developers and builders to pay for the construction of
streets and other urban infrastructure in exchange for tax exemptions
(Bassols 1973).
However, acceleration of urban growth of Spanish cities around the turn
of the century made the new plans of expansion obsolete and the available
land for new construction scarce12. Developers and constructors tried to
overcome this restriction by increasing urban density (e.g. increasing the
amount of floors or constructing in space between houses) or by expanding
accommodation to suburbs, an area that was not regulated by urbanisation
plans. The fact is that the Spanish law allowed owners to build on their land
without permission and size restrictions outside areas of the plan (Nun˜ez
Grane´s 1920, p. 12). Contemporary reports highlight the disorder in con-
struction and lack of infrastructures that predominated in such new urban
developments, which became increasingly abundant13.
In sum, Spanish policy regarding housing was free-market based. The
Liberal Revolution created an institutional framework that defined property
rights and facilitated the operation of housing markets. On the one hand,
ownership laws created a dual market of owners and renters, the latter being
the majority of the Spanish population. Regulation of the leasing market
protected landlords more than renters, who had relatively few rights. Indeed,
this caused dysfunctions and affected the quality of housing but facilitated
the transference of property. On the other hand, the regulation of land for
urban development did not impede a continuous increase in the available
land for new dwellings. When regulated land for urban construction became
increasingly scarce, developers moved to suburbs. In suburbs, regulations
simply did not exist but ownership of land and houses was recognised by the
authorities. Therefore, there are no reasons to think that Spanish policy
impeded the free operation of housing markets and the continuous expan-
sion of the supply of new houses.
12 For example, Madrid in 1900 had doubled the urbanised surface and had practically
exhausted the land for new houses in the zoning area.
13 The Instituto de Reformas Sociales elaborated numerous reports and proposed reforms for
what they understood as one of the biggest problems of the working population, especially between
1904 and 1924. It proposed increasing the developable surface, so reducing density, and increasing
the number and quality of public services. Some projects were launched but were not very
successful or produced low-quality housing.
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3. THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSING TRANSACTIONS
Using the quantitative information of the Registrars’ Yearbooks, we can
reconstruct the evolution of Spanish urban housing markets from 1904 to
1934. In the yearbooks, «urban properties» (fincas urbanas) are defined as
non-farm real estate property, including land and buildings on it; during our
period, only complete properties (fincas) could be sold (see above). Both
value (price) and number of transactions were recorded in the notaries and
from there reported to the Direccio´n del Registro de la Propiedad y del
Notariado. In its yearbooks numbers and values are aggregated to report the
total value and number of sales in each province in each year. Dividing the
first number by the second we obtain nominal average prices.
Unfortunately, the yearbook does not contain information about addi-
tional characteristics of the «fincas» whose ownership changed hands, such
as the year of construction, number of floors and so on. We aim to approx-
imate these characteristics and correct for their distribution across provinces
and changes over time by incorporating information from decadal building
censuses, as described below.
Figure 1 presents information on the number of urban buildings sold in
the whole country and the six provinces with the most populated cities (i.e.
Barcelona, Madrid, Biscay, Seville, Valencia and Saragossa). On average,
57,600 fincas urbanas were sold per year over our period. We divide the
evolution in the number of houses sold into three periods. In the first decade
of this series (i.e. from 1904 to 1913), ,50,000 houses were sold per year.
In other words,,1 per cent of the total housing stock was traded each year14.
In the following decade, from 1914 to 1923, the number of transactions grew
at yearly rates of 5 per cent, from the low point of 48,500 sales in 1915 to the
maximum of 73,500 in 1924. In 1920, about the 1.3 per cent of the housing
stock was traded. During the remaining years (i.e. 1924-1933/1934), the
number of market transactions began to decline, and the share of the stock
traded decreased to 1.1 per cent in 1930. In 1933/1934, the number of
transactions, c. 52,000, was slightly below that reported for 1904/1905.
As can be seen from the graph, the share of sales in the six provinces with the
largest cities in the total increased over time from an average of 26 per cent in
the first decade of our sample to an average of 29.5 per cent between 1914 and
1923, and almost 34 per cent between 1924 and 1933. These figures show that
there is a cycle in the number of transactions for the whole of Spain, and much
of this can be attributed to the turnover in the provinces with the largest cities.
14 More specifically, in 1900, the traded stock represented 1.2 per cent of the total housing
stock. In 1910, the traded stock represented 1.0 per cent of the total housing stock. We obtained
these figures by dividing the number of houses sold in 1904 and 1910 (interpolated) by the number
of houses (edificios) counted in Spain’s 1900 and 1910 censuses, respectively. The Canary Islands
and possessions in Africa are excluded from both sales and stock volumes.
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Table 1 adds granularity to this picture by dividing Spain into the six
macro-regions defined by Rose´s and Sa´nchez-Alonso (2004). To give better
insights into relative developments, we also contrast the evolution of trans-
action numbers in the mentioned provinces with the largest cities in com-
parison with those six provinces with the lowest population numbers in cities
with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Reher 1986)15 and the lowest absolute
provincial population16. Since the absolute numbers of transactions depend
on the number of inhabitants, panel b of Table 1 scales them to «sales per
1,000 inhabitants» in adjacent census years. Finally, since comparability over
space might also be affected by different average size of buildings, we try to
provide a simple adjustment by multiplying the number of sales by the
average amount of floors in the corresponding building census (corre-
sponding to the stock, not the flow of buildings) before dividing them by the
population figures (see panel c in Table 1). Although, on average, buildings
FIGURE 1
THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSACTION NUMBERS FOR URBAN, NON-FARM
PROPERTY IN SPAIN, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS.
Sources: Anuario de la Direccio´n General. 1904-1934 (1909 and 1910 are interpolated).
15 Unfortunately, there is no census information that makes our urban, non-farm property
building numbers comparable with the urban population living in them. «Urban», as defined by the
building census, includes places much smaller than 5,000 inhabitants.
16 See note to Table 1 on the provinces included in the latter six-city samples.
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TABLE 1
THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSING TRANSACTIONS, 1904-33
1904-13 1914-23 1924-33 1904-33
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Mean number of market transactions per year
Andalusia 13,896 16,514 14,947 15,016
Mediterranean 17,231 21,986 26,327 21,882
Ebro Valley 3,654 4,235 4,279 4,031
Northern Castile 4,447 3,890 3,733 3,995
Southern Castile 7,479 9,010 9,465 8,630
North 3,519 4,028 4,672 4,051
Spain 50,226 59,662 63,422 57,604
Six provinces largest cities 12,751 17,279 20,728 16,898
Six provinces least urban population 1,477 1,089 936 1,152
Six provinces lowest population 1,754 1,561 1,467 1,580
(b) Mean number of market transactions of houses per 1,000 inhabitants
Andalusia 3.6 3.9 3.2 3.6
Mediterranean 3.9 4.6 4.9 4.5
Ebro Valley 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1
Northern Castile 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.7
Southern Castile 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.2
North 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
Spain 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.7
Six provinces largest cities 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.6
Six provinces least urban population 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8
Six provinces lowest population 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.5
(c) Mean number of market transactions of floors per 1,000 inhabitants
Andalusia 6.2 6.7 5.5 6.1
Mediterranean 7.9 9.4 9.7 9.1
Ebro Valley 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.6
Northern Castile 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.9
Southern Castile 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.9
North 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.9
Spain 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.1
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are slightly taller in the north than in the south of the country, especially in
the Basque Country, this adjustment changes the relations very little.
Two main findings stand out from Table 1: the first is the almost uniform
increase in average transaction numbers for the last two decades vs. the
initial decade, confirming the national pattern17. This can be observed for all
indicators, however they are transformed. On average, 2.7 urban buildings
are traded per year for every 1,000 inhabitants of Spain, increasing from
2.6 in the first period to 2.8 for the last two decades.
The second finding is the confirmation of the increasing importance of
the six provinces with the largest cities, even if the numbers are adjusted by
population size. In these provinces, on average, 3.2 buildings were traded per
1,000 inhabitants in the first decade of our sample, increasing to 3.8 in the
second and 3.7 in the last sub-period. Interestingly, the difference between
the six provinces with largest cities and the Spanish mean increases over
time. Most striking is the difference, both in levels and in trends of the
provinces with small urban and total populations, which show much lower
total, per head and per floor transaction numbers, which are also decline
sharply over time. This is additional evidence of the impact of the rural-
urban transition on regional real estate markets.
To put the number of transactions in perspective, Table 2 gives an idea of
the stock of housing in the population and building census years 1900, 1910,
1920 and 1930. We observe a constant increase in the number of buildings
from 4.5 to 5.4 million, although the pace of this increase seems to be slightly
below that of population growth, as the number of buildings and floors per
person decreases slightly over time, despite slightly increasing number of
floors per building (from 1.82 to 1.86 in the national average).
In accordance with the concentration of the numbers of transactions we
also observe a concentration process in the total number of buildings: While
in 1900 13.6 per cent of the buildings were located in the six provinces with
TABLE 1 (Cont.)
Six provinces largest cities 6.8 8.0 7.5 7.5
Six provinces least urban population 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.4
Six provinces lowest population 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.2
Notes: See text. Population numbers and floors per building for census/building census years 1910,
1920, 1930, respectively. Six provinces with largest cities are Barcelona, Madrid, Seville, Valencia, Biscay
(Bilbao), Zaragoza. Six provinces with lowest urban population are Avila, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Orense,
Segovia and Soria. Six provinces with lowest absolute population are Alava, Guadalajara, Logrono (La
Rioja), Palencia, Segovia and Soria.
Sources: See Figure 1 and Population census for the respective years.
17 The one exception is the largely rural region of Northern Castile, where transaction numbers
decline in all provinces after the first decade.
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TABLE 2
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOUSING STOCK IN CENSUS YEARS, 1900-30
1900 1910 1920 1930
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Housing stock in census years
Andalucia 743,682 774,874 820,193 868,237
Mediterranean 928,153 1,005,744 1,060,518 1,212,268
Ebro Valley 561,300 570,367 585,810 607,055
Northern Castile 791,949 821,833 839,056 867,528
Southern Castile 671,376 738,372 794,315 899,669
North 828,756 881,554 915,600 973,006
Spain 4,525,216 4,792,744 5,015,492 5,427,763
Six provinces largest cities 613,300 659,348 706,402 827,167
Six provinces least urban population 496,782 516,613 528,081 557,967
Six provinces lowest population 319,036 325,707 330,589 335,551
(b) Housing stock per 1,000 inhabitants in census years
Andalucia 209 202 196 188
Mediterranean 223 226 223 225
Ebro Valley 315 311 302 303
Northern Castile 344 348 357 349
Southern Castile 221 217 211 205
North 245 243 236 233
Spain 248 246 240 235
Six provinces largest cities 170 167 156 148
Six provinces least urban population 364 363 368 371
Six provinces lowest population 323 321 329 318
(c) Floors per 1,000 inhabitants in census years
Andalucia 347 344 333 321
Mediterranean 454 461 451 445
Ebro Valley 680 678 659 669
Northern Castile 576 598 622 614
Southern Castile 376 374 363 351
North 421 441 433 430
Spain 451 456 447 437
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the largest cities, in 1930 this share was 15.2 per cent. The share of buildings
in the least populated cities, on the other hand, decreased from 7.1 to 6.2 per
cent, despite slightly increasing absolute numbers. While the housing stock
increased by an average of 0.6 per cent per year in Spain, it increased by 1.0
per cent per year in the provinces with the largest cities, but only by ,0.2 per
cent in the least populated provinces.
4. THE HEDONIC INDEX OF SPANISH HOUSING MARKETS
To trace the evolution of urban real estate prices over our 30-year period,
it is advisable to keep both prices and quality of houses, that is, urban non-
farm property, constant over time. Especially between 1916 and 1920, Spain
experienced an inflation spurt that also affected house prices, so that we have
to deflate housing prices to evaluate the real evolution of urban real estate
prices in comparison with the general price level. In addition, like many
other goods, houses differ in characteristics and quality, and the average
quality of housing probably changed during the substantive urbanisation of
the first 30 years of the 20th century. In other words, the characteristics of the
basket of dwellings put onto the market varied from one period to another.
For both reasons, inflation and quality changes, indices based on mean
observed trading prices are not representative for the population of dwellings,
and might not be comparable over time or between places18. While inflation-
adjustment is a standard practice in economic history, the quality-adjustment
undertaken here might require a short introduction to the literature on hedonic,
that is, quality-adjusted, price indices. The idea behind these indices is to esti-
mate econometrically how the price of a product can be related to the product’s
characteristics to be able to control for changes in the average observed variety
and price. The estimated coefficients from this «hedonic regression» are then
used to calculate price indices for a constant-quality «counterfactual» version of
the product. Probably the most prominent example of the use of hedonic price
TABLE 2 (Cont.)
Six provinces largest cities 354 350 326 301
Six provinces least urban population 636 650 662 671
Six provinces lowest population 641 660 675 659
Notes and sources: See Table 1.
18 Alternative indices based on median transaction prices are less sensitive to extremely
observed transactions, but still subject to selectivity bias, as the average quality of dwellings sold
may change over time (Gourie´roux and Laferre`re 2009).
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adjustments in the calculation of price indices is from the rapidly advancing
technologies of the information and communication technology sector (Berndt
and Griliches 1993; Triplett 2006). When constructing hedonic price indices,
one important distinction faced by the researcher is that between changing
characteristics of the good in question and variables explaining demand and
supply for the good in question. For the construction of the hedonic index, only
characteristics are to be taken into account to construct an artificial reference
variety of the good, «Variety Without Qualities»19, whose main purpose is also
to incorporate constant qualities over time. Supply and demand variables might
then in a second step, not undertaken here, explain price differences and
movements of that reference variety across space and time.
For the computation of housing price indices, the advantages of the
hedonic methodology have long been recognised by the literature (Case et al.
1991; Diewert 2006). Ideally, one should observe a representative sample of
all individual transactions and their characteristics relevant for the hedonic
method. Unfortunately, this is impossible for the distant past given that
sources offer only average prices of houses sold, while standard/average
characteristics and quality can only be observed for the entire sample/stock
of dwellings. Therefore, to be able to make hedonic adjustments, we have to
assume that our dwellings are in some way a representative sample of the
whole population. However, since it is possible that buyers reacted to soaring
prices by demanding lower qualities (and vice versa for decreasing prices),
our indices might overestimate upward and downward movements in
dwelling prices but not their long-run tendency.
Our hedonic price index was calculated using three successive steps. First
we checked the original data on nominal sales volumes and sales numbers at
the provincial level for consistency and calculated average nominal prices for
each province and year using the value and number of sales for urban non-
farm properties (fincas urbanas) for which a price was actually paid, that is,
excluding inheritance or other non-sale property transfers (Fincas enajenadas
por actos o contratos en que media precio). In the process, we found that for
many provinces the data for 1927 are completely inconsistent with other
years, and we therefore excluded it20. For the presentation of the index we
interpolated data for this year and for 1909 and 1910, for which no sales
19 We borrow this term from the title of Robert Musil’s novel «The Man Without Qualities»
(Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 1930-1943).
20 For example, according to our source the number of sales in the province of Guadalajara
increased from 140 in 1926 to 3,901 in 1927, and then fell back to 119, the long-run average
(excluding 1927) being 143 sales per year. In Soria, the number of sales was reported as 3,571, with
the long-run average (excluding 1927) being 82 sales per year. In contrast, in Valencia, the number
of sales fell from 7,672 in 1926 to 977 in 1927, being 5,724 in 1928, and in the province of Oviedo
sales were reported as 100, against a long-run average of (excluding 1927) 1,184 sales per year. Many
more examples could be quoted. Since at the national level the figures seem relatively consistent
with former and later years (68,228 sales against 63,553 in 1926 and 67,028 in 1928), we suppose
that figures for different provinces have been reported for others, probably due to typographic
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records have been published. In the preparation of the hedonic index,
however, the values for these years have been treated as missing. We also
corrected other values from the original publication because the figures
were highly implausible, that is, they diverged by more than two standard
deviations from the arithmetic mean of real prices for the whole period21.
The average nominal prices per province calculated are then converted
into average real PPP prices (Barcelona 19105 100) using the province-
specific urban consumer price indices from Rose´s and Sa´nchez-Alonso
(2004). This consumer price index is comprehensive since it collects infor-
mation on food, textiles, housing equipment, fuel prices and housing rents22.
As we will see later, this correction accounts for the bulk of the difference
between the reported nominal and hedonic real indices.
However, since we expect important differences between the characteristics
of the average property sold in provinces with low levels of urbanisation and
industrialisation (such as Soria, Teruel or Lugo) and those containing the large
and industrialising Spanish metropolitan areas (such as Madrid, Barcelona or
Biscay with its urban cluster around Bilbao), we have to correct the prices not
just for PPP differences, but also for different characteristics of the properties
themselves, and therefore use hedonic price adjustment. We use a two-step
procedure, departing from the idea that the price of an urban property is
actually a function of the bundle of prices for each relevant feature of a prop-
erty, for example, its location, size (number of floors), age, etc. The first step of
our hedonic correction therefore is the «hedonic regression» of the price of
urban properties on measures of the different characteristics, so that the effects
of each characteristic on the final price are estimates of the price elasticities to
changes in each characteristic. The coefficients of this regression are then used
to calculate the price of a reference property in each province, which has
baseline characteristics. This means the properties sold in different provinces
become comparable. To this end, we follow the approach of Gourie´roux and
Laferre`re (2009), who calculate hedonic indexes for real estate property in
(F’note continued)
confusion, and this to an extent that makes it impossible to reassign the sales numbers and values to
the correct provinces.
21 This resulted in 33 corrections of values for the time period 1904-1931, mostly in small
provinces. The maximum number of corrections per province is 3 for Guipuscoa (1924, 1925, 1929)
and Navarre (1904, 1919, 1929). We abstained from corrections of real prices between 1932 and
1934, except for the province of Burgos in 1932 and Seville in 1934, where we see implausible
movements in the value of property. Real prices increase from 1,934 to 6,550 pesetas per unit in
Burgos 1932, and fall from 5,783 to 730 pesetas per property in Seville in 1934. After correcting a
typographic error in the original source (one digit missing) we obtain a real average value of 6,284.
In Burgos, we linearly interpolated the price to 2,189.
22 One might argue that some of our urban (non-farm) properties are located in rural regions
(especially in the less urbanised provinces) and therefore their price should be deflated by a rural
CPI. While in theory this might be true, in the reality of early 20th-century Spain, rural and urban
CPIs at the provincial level were highly correlated and therefore the problem is, in practice, less
relevant (see Carmona and Rose´s 2012 for average farm prices deflated by rural CPIs).
SPANISH HOUSING MARKETS, 1904-1934
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 133
modern-day France based on information about the characteristics of indivi-
dual properties and their sales from French notaries. However, we do not have
information on individual buildings, but just on average prices and character-
istics per province, so we have to modify their approach accordingly.
Following Gourie´roux and Laferre`re (2009), we assume age, number of
floors and location (which province, average degree of agglomeration) to be the
most important characteristics. We first reconstruct the average age and — to
account for potential discontinuities between zero year old «new» buildings and
1-year-old «old» buildings — the average share of new buildings to account for
average vintage per province, the average number of floors, and the average
share of isolated buildings (those located in «settlements» with five or fewer
buildings) per province and year as explained in the following. Our approach
allows us to correct for some of the shortcomings of the Yearbook’s price data,
for example, the lack of distinction between new and second-hand properties.
Nevertheless, it is necessarily based on the assumption that in each year the
characteristics of the urban properties sold reflect the average characteristics of
the existing stock of buildings, which changes only slowly between census years,
thereby making our hedonic adjustments rather conservative. It is likely that
further quality adjustments of prices (e.g. if we assume that all new houses were
traded during the year) would result in even lower price increases.
For the reconstruction of average age per province we use information on
the increase of the stock of buildings between 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930, for
which the inhabited buildings census provides the number of buildings per
province, as presented in Table 2. Due to the lack of provincial data before
1900, we assume a uniform initial age distribution of buildings across pro-
vinces, which we reconstruct from the figures on gross capital formation
in dwellings for the whole of Spain in Prados de la Escosura (2003, table
A7-2A), assuming that the share of buildings age 0-70 in 1900 is represented
by the relative gross capital formation in each year between 1855 and 1900.
The stock of buildings in 1855 that emerges from re-extrapolating the stock
in 1855 with the gross capital formation growth rates is assumed to have
been built uniformly distributed with the share of (1/25)3 stock of 1856
between 1830 and 1855 in each year. The assumption of 70 years service age
per building is taken from Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2010). With this
data, we reconstruct by province how many of the existing buildings were
built in each year between 1830 and 1934. Since before 1900 we have no
information at the provincial level, before that year we assume a uniform
distribution all over Spain, with 1.07 per cent of all buildings being from
1830 (and therefore 70 years old in 1900) as well as from each of the years
before 1856. From 1856 to 1900, we use the shares the gross capital for-
mation by Prados de la Escosura mentioned above; so, for example, 2.2 per
cent of all 1900 buildings are assumed to be from 1866 (34 years old), when
gross capital formation was very strong, but only 0.8 per cent from the fol-
lowing year (33 years old) when building activity slackened. Multiplying the
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shares of each year by the age of buildings it represents leads us to an average
age of 31.1 years in 1900 for all buildings in Spain.
From there, we extrapolate the stock in each year with the compound
growth rate per province between adjacent census years. The share of new
buildings is then defined as the net number of new buildings in each year
(increases in the stock following from intercensus growth rates) plus the
number of buildings of the initial (1900) distribution that «retire» as they
become older than 70 years (e.g. the 1.07 per cent of all buildings assumed to
be constructed in 1830 in the year 1901). The average age is calculated from
the initial distribution and the share of new buildings after 1900 as the
sample moves on. Since after 1900 we have data on province level growth
rates of the housing stock, now the average age per building can vary
between provinces. We can see that in 1904 the average age is still grouped
quite closely around our uniform initial estimate of 31.1 years in 1900 for all
provinces, with a minimum of 30.2 for the province of Oviedo (Asturias) and
a maximum of 32.8 for the province of Lerida23. In 1934, the minimum is
24.5 years for Madrid and the maximum 37.1 for Cadiz. Since our hedonic
regressions include fixed effects per province, what we are measuring here is the
increasing deviation from the mean, not so much the absolute average age,
which is of course much more subject to our assumptions. Since the relation
between average age and price might not be (log) linear, we also add the average
share of new buildings per year to our regressions, calculated as the ratio of new
buildings as stated above to the total stock in each province-year.
The second characteristic, the average number of floors, can also be
calculated from the information in the inhabited building censuses, which
state how many buildings had one, two or three and more floors. «More than
3 floors» is refined to three, four and five and more in the 1930 census. We
use the average of the latter (assuming «5 and more» to be five) to calculate
the province-specific meaning of «3 and more». Between census years we
interpolate with compound growth rates. In 1904, the (unweighted) average
number of floors is 1.88 per building, with a maximum of 2.82 for Guipuscoa
and a minimum of 1.32 for Huelva24. In 1934, the minimum was 1.37 for
Huelva and the maximum 2.92 for Guipuscoa.
In the same way, we also calculate the average share of isolated inhabited
buildings (according to the censuses, these are located in groups of five or
fewer buildings) as a proxy for the urban density, and hence likely positive
agglomeration effects in a province. On average, this share is lowest in
Salamanca (3.8 per cent) and highest in Guipuscoa (46.7 per cent), clearly
23 This means that the number of buildings in Lerida between 1900 and 1910 increased by less
than the part of the stock calculated to be withdrawn between these years (those constructed
between 1830 and 1840): in these years 440 houses were built on average per year in this province,
while 968 would exit our calculations (and by assumption cease to exist) per year.
24 Actually, the lowest value was 1.1 to 1.2 for the Canary Islands, which have been excluded
from our indices because of lack of CPI.
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showing different settlement patterns across Spain. We use this variable,
since the building census does not distinguish clearly between urban and
non-urban areas, and only gives the share of «isolated» buildings. We take
this as an approximation of the likelihood that the average non-farm prop-
erty in a province is not located in an important metropolis, but in a rather
small place. Please note that we use this as a proxy for an average char-
acteristic of the building, not as an explanatory variable of its price, as for
example population density might be. Also, the share of «isolated» buildings
is not necessarily highly correlated with population density, but with the
relative agglomeration of buildings in space.
As a second correction for the location effect, we include province-
specific fixed effects into our regression, controlling for all kinds of differences
that are fixed over time. This is mainly econometrically motivated to avoid
omitted variable bias in our estimations. It also implies that our main source of
variation and basis of identification for the coefficients is not variation between
places, but for the same places over time. Remember that correcting for inter-
temporal variations in characteristics is the main motivation for calculating
hedonic prices. Normally, and throughout our paper, we are not comparing the
levels of prices over provinces, but the relative evolution of price indices with
the same base year over time.
With these variables we estimate a frequency-weighted panel GLS
regression; the weights are average number of sales per province over the
whole period, which is a very reasonable choice given that the prices we have
are average prices for that number of buildings (the panels estimator we use
requires the use of constant frequency weights over time, therefore the
average). The results are reported in Table 3.
All coefficients are precisely estimated and show the expected signs:
prices are higher for provinces having, on average, buildings with more
floors, more recently constructed buildings, buildings that are not isolated
and a larger share of new buildings. To give an insight into the implications
for the construction of the hedonic index for two of the main variables,
numbers of floors and age, the average house in Spain (excluding the Canary
Islands) had 1.86 floors in 1910 and was, according to our calculations
(weighted with the population of buildings according to the 1910 census),
31.8 years old. Adding one more floor to the average building (increasing
number of floors by 54 per cent) would, according to our results, increase the
real price by 66 per cent and one additional year of age (ageing the average
building by 3.1 per cent) would reduce the real price by 1.4 per cent. Therefore,
if the average age, number of floors or the other characteristics change over
time, we will take that into account. The hedonic index will therefore only
increase or decrease if real prices change more than the changes «statistically
justified» by changes in average characteristics (or if nominal prices change
more than the average cost of living index plus the change in average
characteristics).
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Technically, based on our results in Table 3, following Gourie´roux and
Laferre`re (2009, p. 210), we calculate the log hedonic price ~pj;t as the
difference between the observed prices p j;t and the characteristics weighted
by their coefficients. We assume that the weights are stable over time. This is
lnð ~pj; tÞ ﬃ lnðpj;tÞ
XK
k¼ 1
b^ k; sX k; j; t ¼ ln
 
p j;t
EXPðPK
k¼1
b^ k;s X k;j;tÞ
!
ð1Þ
Or in our case
ln ðhedonic priceÞ ¼ ln ½ðreal average priceÞ=ðexp ð1:230846 ln ðfloorÞ
þ 0:4347637 ln ðageÞ þ 1:61455 ðshare isolatedÞ
þ 8:607792 ðsharenewÞÞÞ ð2Þ
The hedonic price index then is calculated for every province j by the dif-
ference of the logs I t/1904, j5exp(lnhedonicreal t,j – lnhedonicreal 1904, j) and
rebased to 19045100. From these a To¨rnquist index, an approximation of
the Divisia index for the whole of Spain (excluding the Canary Islands) is
constructed, where the shares of expenditure (real value of total sales per
province) are used as weights (see Hulten 2008). These could be compared
with Divisia indices of the nominal and PPP adjusted real price indices per
province25.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATION OF DETERMINANTS OF THE HEDONIC INDEX
Coefficient SE T P. /t/
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(floors) 1.2308 0.0156 77.58 0.000
Ln(age) 20.4376 0.0043 299.85 0.000
Share isolated 21.6145 0.0108 2149.73 0.000
Share new 8.6077 0.0482 178.51 0.000
Constant 8.7445 0.0482 178.51 0.000
F-test 17450.24 0.000
R2 overall 0.3051
Notes: We estimate the equation [1]. The method of estimations is GLS with fixed effects. Regression is
weighted by the mean number of houses sold. The number of observation is 1,344 (48 groups328 years).
Sources: See Figure 1.
25 We also calculate such indices for the provinces with the six largest cities of Spain (Madrid,
Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, Biscay with Bilbao and Saragossa), and for the six macro-regions as
defined in Rose´s and Sa´nchez-Alonso (2004): Andalusia (Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva,
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As a consistency check, we also calculated the hedonic index, with the
same basis data for the provincial average properties, for transactions that
were not made by contracts with a sales price (Fincas enajenadas por actos o
contratos en que no media precio). These are mainly bequests and other sorts
of non-market transfers. Here, we excluded the share of new urban proper-
ties since there is no reason to assume that they play the same role in this sort
of transaction as in «normal» market transactions. The hedonic regression in
this case, again with precisely estimated coefficients and expected signs,
leads to the following equation:
ln ðhedonic priceÞ ¼ ln ½ðreal average priceÞ=ðexp ð0:4755128 ln ðfloorÞ
þ 2:478677 ln ðageÞ þ 2:297104 ðshare isolatedÞÞÞ
ð3Þ
Figure A1 shows that the real and hedonic prices of these non-market
transactions actually follow a similar pattern to the market transactions, with
the exception of the late-/post-war inflation spurt, when real values dropped
for non-market transactions, while they increased for market transactions. In
both cases, the main adjustment of prices does not follow from the hedonic
quality-adjustment, but just from converting nominal into real prices,
although the hedonic adjustment in the case of non-market transactions
seems to be more pronounced, probably because of the slightly different
formula we applied.
Please note that hedonic prices are normally presented as indices (Die-
wert 2006, pp. 103-104), since their construction involves correcting for the
individual characteristics, so that the result is the creation of a «Building
Without Qualities», those being constant over time, but not meaningful in
terms of imagining the actual hedonic reference building. For a house in
Barcelona in 1910, which is the place and period the PPAs we use are
benchmarked onto, the real price would be 10,566 pesetas, while the hedonic
price would be 18,103 pesetas. The observation that the hedonic price is
higher than the real price is due to the sum of the adjustments above and the
resulting artificial characteristics of the «constant no qualities reference
building». Note that it does not have any meaningful implication for price
levels, living standards, etc. The lowest price in that year would be 1,072
«Barcelona pesetas» per house in Almerı´a in real terms, which would
increase to 4,008 «hedonic Barcelona pesetas». Buildings in Barcelona in
(F’note continued)
Jaen, Malaga and Seville), Mediterranean (Gerona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellon, Valencia,
Alicante, Murcia and Balearic Islands), Ebro Valley (Lerida, Saragossa, Huesca, Teruel, Logrono,
Alava and Navarre), Southern Castile (Caceres, Badajoz, Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Guadala-
jara, Madrid and Toledo), Northern Castile (Salamanca, Zamora, Leon, Valladolid, Palencia, Bur-
gos, Soria, Segovia and Avila) and North (Corunna, Pontevedra, Lugo, Orense, Asturias, Santander,
Guipuscoa and Biscay).
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that year have on average 2.3 floors, are 30.6 years old, 1.4 per cent of them
are new, and 13.6 per cent are isolated, while in Almeria the average building
has 1.4 floors, is 33.0 years old, 0.6 per cent new and 15 per cent isolated.
This example shows that in absolute terms, the hedonic adjustment is
increasing the value of our buildings by about 7,500 pesetas in Barcelona and
by close to 3,000 pesetas in Almerı´a. Table 4 gives a more detailed overview
of price levels and also compares real prices in sales transactions to those
where no price was reported for 1904-193426.
In this context, it is worthwhile noting that we have used the fixed effects
only to estimate the coefficients in the first stage, not to construct the
hedonic prices using those coefficients. If we had done so, we would have
assumed that systematic differences in the price level apart from the char-
acteristics we control for, between Barcelona and Almerı´a would be due to
unobserved characteristics of the (average) buildings in both places. While
there might be such differences, most of the systematic difference should be
due to factors treated by economic geography, such as different amenities
or productivity of labour due to scale effects or economic structure which
have little to do with the characteristics of buildings and much more to
TABLE 4
AVERAGE LEVELS OF REAL AND HEDONIC PRICES, 1904-34
Average price
sales (real)
Average price non-sales
transactions (real)
Average price
sales, (hedonic)
Andalucia 2,536 4,222 6,705
Mediterranean 4,128 4,401 7,557
Ebro Valley 2,857 2,407 6,388
Northern Castile 2,010 2,202 4,786
Southern Castile 5,490 6,577 10,060
North 8,184 9,548 16,666
Spain 3,971 4,679 8,082
Six provinces largest
cities
7,419 8,499 12,992
Six provinces least
urban population
2,062 2,279 5,031
Six provinces lowest
population
2,857 2,555 5,813
Notes and sources: prices in PPP-adjusted «Barcelona 1910 pesetas», weighted by average number of
sales/non-sales transactions per province.
26 Table does not report hedonic price levels for non-price transactions, since the index is
constructed differently (no share new included) its values in levels are much higher.
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do with the regional macroeconomic environment. When, we assessing the
latter using our new data, we therefore recommend using fixed effects. For
the indices presented in the following, this is not of importance, since they
set 19105100 for all provinces and only report the movement over time for
each province or other aggregate.
5. THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSING PRICES IN SPAIN
Figure 2 presents the basic information regarding the evolution of
Spanish housing prices. As we can observe at once, successive adjustments
decrease growth rates of housing prices; that is, nominal housing prices grew
faster than real housing prices which in turn rose faster than hedonic
adjusted real housing prices. From these results we could infer that overall
inflation (CPI) was a major mover in housing prices and that the quality of
housing increased over the period. This finding is not surprising given that
buildings are built to last a long time (by our assumption, 70 years) and
therefore despite animated construction activity, the average characteristics
of the stock of buildings change rather slowly, while, on the other hand, we
see a major inflation spurt around World War I, with the overall consumer
price index doubling between 1912 and 1920 (Prados de la Escosura 2003),
FIGURE 2
THE EVOLUTION OF SPANISH HOUSING PRICES, 19045 100
Sources: see Figure 1.
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with most of this increase falling between 1916 and 1920, a period in which
we observe a rise in nominal house prices of 96 per cent.
This episode from 1915/1916 actually marks the major break point in the
nominal housing index. Until then, inflation in Spain was relatively low (note
that Spain did not adhere to the Gold Standard over the entire period) and real
housing prices grew faster than consumer prices (real series grew faster than
nominal series). In the middle of the War (by 1916), this situation changed and
nominal prices grew faster than real prices. Spanish neutrality during the War
was not accompanied by an increase in real house prices. The fact is that until
1920, as the real hedonic price index shows, housing prices did not recover pre-
war levels. This result is unexpected given that, due to its neutrality, Spain
increased its exportations and benefited from the arrival of foreign capital,
which was sometimes invested in non-tradable assets like houses.
During the 1920s housing prices decreased again, but they did not actu-
ally recover their 1920 level until 1930. Note that the 1920s were a period of
rapid growth for the Spanish economy, with unprecedented GDP and TFP
growth rates (Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s 2009). Furthermore, the
quality of housing increased slightly (as shown by the faster growth of the
real index in comparison to the hedonic adjusted index). During the first
years of the Second Republic (1931-1934), house prices seem to have fol-
lowed Spain’s political cycle: decreased when the left-wing coalition took
government, while the contrary holds when right-wing parties replaced it.
The impact of the Great Depression, however, is less apparent: housing
prices decreased in 1932 and 1933 but less than during the early 1920s.
The presence of huge short-run (yearly) fluctuations in Spanish housing
prices from 1904 to 1934 is not obvious. Yearly movements exceeding the
10 per cent of increase or decrease can only be observed in 7 years; that is,
23 per cent of all years. In 1915, 1921, 1928 and 1932 prices decreased by
more than 10 per cent while the contrary holds in 1925, 1930 and 1934. The
largest increase took place during 1930, when prices increased by 33 per
cent, and the largest decrease took place during 1925, when prices fell by
22 per cent. Also, it is difficult to observe any sustained increase in housing
prices. Furthermore, if we do not consider the extraordinary year 1934,
housing prices were lower in 1933 than in 1904. This suggests that housing
was not a very profitable long-run investment in Spain.
A substantial literature has underlined that housing prices tend to grow
faster in large cities, where supply restrictions should be more evident. For
this reason, we have computed individual indices for the six provinces con-
taining the most populated Spanish cities (Barcelona, Madrid, Biscay,
Seville, Valencia and Saragossa). Also, to consider regional differences, we
have computed indices for the six Spanish macro-regions (as defined in
Rose´s and Sa´nchez-Alonso 2004).
Figure 3 reviews the evolution of the adjusted hedonic index containing
the six provinces with the most populated metropolises (hereafter six-
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provinces index) and the equivalent Spanish index. Our six-provinces index
follows the same pattern as the Spanish index but expansion/depression
cycles were more pronounced. Therefore, the downturn during the first years
of the First World War in the six-provinces index was more pronounced
but so too was the subsequent housing price growth. Again, evidence on
dramatic fluctuations is elusive.
Now, we are looking for evidence on dramatic housing increases by
looking at individual series for the six-provinces (Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E
and 4F). The hedonic real housing index for the province of Barcelona
(Figure 4A) follows the Spanish pattern in the long run but one can observe
up to four major episodes of price exuberance in the years 1906, 1913, 1918-
1920 and 1934. In this last year, hedonic housing prices doubled! In Biscay
(Figure 4B), not only long-run evolution differs from Spain’s, but also one
can observe another three major upswings in the years 1906, 1908 and 1919-
1920. Interestingly, housing prices decreased significantly after the 1929
crisis; perhaps, this was due to the fact that Bilbao was a major mineral
export and shipping centre and, hence, closely connected with the fortune
of markets abroad. Also, as the region was the seat of major steel and
FIGURE 3
THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSING PRICES IN SPAIN AND ITS SIX PROVINCES
CONTAINING THE MOST POPULATED CITIES, 19045100
Sources: see Figure 1.
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investment goods factories, it was particularly hit by the second wave of the
crisis after 193127. In the case of Madrid (Figure 4C), the synchronisation
with Spanish housing prices is more evident and price increases were much
less pronounced than in the previously mentioned two provinces. Again, we
observe several major episodes of price expansion in 1918-1920, 1925 and
1930-1931, and also an enormous slump, when housing prices practically
halved, in 1933. The price evolution of Saragossa (Figure 4D) shows plenty of
ups and downs. At first sight, we can observe major upswings in 1906, 1920,
1926 and 1930; and a period of sustained growth in housing prices from 1910
to 1916. It might be worth noting that changes in Spanish trade policy
benefited the city of Saragossa, which industrialised over this period. The
province of Seville (Figure 4E) also experienced several episodes of excep-
tional increases in housing prices: 1912, 1930 and 1933-1934. Finally, in the
province of Valencia (Figure 4F), one can observe several episodes of
explosive growth in the years 1907, 1911, 1931 and 1933.
Figures 5A-5F review the evolution of housing prices in the six Spanish
macro-regions compared with Spain. Synchronisation with Spain’s overall
price evolution is evident in the Mediterranean region (Figure 5B), and
Southern Castile (Figure 5D). In contrast, in the other four regions housing
prices were apparently much less coordinated with the Spanish average. In
Andalusia (Figure 5A), housing prices decreased during First World War
(while the contrary holds for Spain) and price movements were more marked
from 1925 onwards. In the Ebro Valley (Figure 5C), prices grew faster than in
the rest of the country and peaks were much more abundant and pro-
nounced. Northern Castile (Figure 5E) experienced an enormous increase in
house prices in 1930 when prices tripled! Finally, the North region (Figure 5F)
followed the Spanish pattern until 1929 and then experienced a severe down-
turn in housing prices (at the same time, the average price for all of Spain grew).
A simple comparison of Figures 1 and 2 offers relevant information on
how housing markets worked in Spain. We note that increases in the number
of houses traded did not translate into large movements in the hedonic-
adjusted housing prices. In particular, during the 1920s, the number of
transactions rapidly expanded, but housing prices remained stable in Spain
and its six most populated provinces.
In light of the rather dramatic changes that occurred during the urban-rural
transition process throughout this period (see introduction), we are quite sur-
prised by the housing market’s price stability and rapid adjustments to the
growing number of transactions. By and large, the market operated smoothly
(i.e. increasing demand was met by increasing supply, and prices remained
stable over the medium-term horizon of this paper). To make sense of our
findings, we must examine in greater detail the determinants of the market’s
evolution, but this task goes well beyond the limited objectives of this article.
27 We are very grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the basic facts (prices
and quantities) regarding the evolution of Spanish housing markets
during the first third of the 20th century using a new database. The analysis of
FIGURE 4
EVOLUTION OF HOUSING PRICES, 1904-34: (A) BARCELONA VS. SPAIN;
(B) BISCAY VS. SPAIN; (C) MADRID VS. SPAIN; (D) SARAGOSSA VS. SPAIN;
(E) SEVILLE VS. SPAIN; (F) VALENCIA VS. SPAIN.
A B
C D
E F
Notes: see text. Sources: see Figure. 1.
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housing prices has been carried out by calculating real prices and estimating
hedonic prices indices, and a subsequent exploratory analysis of these new
indices.
FIGURE 5
EVOLUTION OF HOUSING PRICES, 1904-34: (A) ANDALUSIA VS. SPAIN;
(B) MEDITERRANEAN REGION VS. SPAIN; (C) EBRO VALLEY VS. SPAIN;
(D) SOUTHERN CASTILE VS. SPAIN; (E) NORTHERN CASTILE VS. SPAIN;
(F) NORTH REGION VS. SPAIN.
A B
C D
E F
Notes: see text. In Northern Castile, values are above 200 after 1930: 1931: 320, 1932: 274, 1933: 252,
1934 309. Sources: see Figure 1.
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This analysis has produced three main findings. First, Spanish housing
transactions increased over the period considered in this study. However,
housing transactions were more numerous in the provinces with the largest
cities than in the rest of the country. This is, indeed, an indication that housing
markets were more active where urban population gained momentum.
Second, at the aggregate level, real Spanish housing prices did not experi-
ence a major upsurge over this period (prices were lower in 1933 than in 1904)
despite major increases in population and urbanisation rates. Therefore,
housing was not a very profitable investment in Spain during the period.
Third, this pattern is replicated in most Spanish regions. Even in the most
densely populated and urbanised provinces, increases in real housing prices
were, at best, modest. In sum, the housing market appears not to have
damaged the reallocation of labour from rural locations to cities, and from
declining to expanding regions. Nevertheless, the regional dimension of
house price changes and their economic implications surely merits attention
and should be an object of further study.
Fourth, and related to the latter point, we would like to highlight that
long-run price stability does not preclude the existence of bubbles in regional
or provincial housing markets. What we have already demonstrated is that, if
bubbles existed, they did not last long. However, our method is not designed
for analysing and detecting housing bubbles. If one looks in detail at graphs
4 and 5, the presence of unexpected and short-lived upsurges in housing
prices is evident at the disaggregate level. To detect bubbles, we should
develop an econometric method capable of separating price fundamentals
from non-fundamentals. In consequence, future research is required to
inform us whether this relatively abundant presence of regional booms in
housing prices was due to irrational episodes.
REFERENCES
ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS MORALES Y POLI´TICAS (1861): «Informe que la Real Academia de
Ciencias Morales y Politicas eleva al Gobierno sobre la reforma de las Leyes de
Inquilinato y los medios de contener el aumento desproporcionado de los alquileres
de edificios», In: Memorias de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Polı´ticas.
Madrid, Vol. I, pp. 265-328.
Anuario de la Direccio´n General de los Registros Civiles y de la Propiedad y del Notariado.
1905-1935. Madrid: Ministerio de Gracia y Justicia, several years.
ALCHIAN, A. A., and DEMSETZ, H. (1973): «The Property Rights Paradigm». Journal of
Economic History 33 (1), pp. 16-27.
AYLLO´N, M. C.; LACASTA, P., and TARANCO´N, O. (1989): «Propiedad y mercado inmobiliario
en Madrid, 1885 (II. El mercado inmobiliario)», in A. Bahamonde and L. Otero (eds),
La sociedad madrilen˜a durante la Restauracio´n, 1876-1931. Madrid: Comunidad de
Madrid, pp. 151-160.
AYUNTAMIENTO DE MADRID (1929): Informacio´n sobre la Ciudad: Memoria. Madrid:
Ayuntamiento de Madrid.
JUAN CARMONA PIDAL/MARKUS LAMPE/JOAN R. ROSE´S
146 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
BASSOLS COMA, M. (1973): Ge´nesis y evolucio´n del derecho urbanı´stico espan˜ol (1812-
1956). Madrid: Montecorvo.
BONO, J. (1979): Historia del derecho notarial espan˜ol. Madrid: Junta de decanos de los
colegios Notariales de Espan˜a.
BERNDT, E. R., and GRILICHES, Z. (1993): «Price Indexes for Microcomputers:
An Exploratory Study», in M. F. Foss; M. E. Manser, and A. H. Young (eds),
Price Measurements and Their Uses. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 63-93.
CARMONA, J., and ROSE´S, J. R. (2012): «Land Markets and Agrarian Backwardness (Spain,
1900-1934)». European Review of Economic History 16 (1), pp. 74-96.
CASE, B.; POLLAKOWSKI, H., and WACHTER, S. (1991): «On Choosing Among House Price
Index Methodologies». Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economic
Association 19 (3), pp. 286-307.
COASE, R. H. (1960): «The Problem of Social Cost». Journal of Law and Economics 3, pp. 1-44.
COLLINS, W. J., and MARGO, R. A. (2003): «Race and the Value of Owner-Occupied
Housing, 1940-1990». Regional Science and Urban Economics 33 (3), pp. 255-286.
COMISIO´N DE REFORMAS SOCIALES (1985): Informacio´n oral y escrita. Madrid: Ministerio de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1985 [1889-1893].
DEMSETZ, H. (1967): «Towards a Theory of Property Rights». American Economic Review
57 (2), pp. 347-373.
DIEWERT, W. E. (2006): «The Paris OECD-IMF Workshop on Real Estate Price Indexes:
Conclusions and Future Directions», in W. E Diewert; B. M. Balk; D. Fixler; K. J. Fox,
and A. O. Nakamura (eds), Price and Productivity Measurement. Housing, vol. 1.
Victoria, BC: Trafford Press, pp. 87-116.
FERNA´NDEZ CLEMENTE, E., and FORCADELL, C. (1992): «Crecimiento econo´mico, diversifica-
cio´n social y expansio´n urbana en Zaragoza, 1900-1930», in J. L. Garcı´a Delgado
(ed.), Las ciudades en la modernizacio´n de Espan˜a. Los decenios interseculares.
Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 433-460.
GALIANA, L., and LLOP, M. (1989): «Propiedad y mercado inmobiliario en Madrid, 1885
(I. Propiedad)», in A. Bahamonde and L. Otero (eds), La sociedad madrilen˜a durante
la Restauracio´n, 1876-1931. Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid, pp. 161-174.
GARCI´A DELGADO, J. L. (ed.), (1992): Las ciudades en la modernizacio´n de Espan˜a. Los
decenios interseculares. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
GOURIE´ROUX, C., and LAFERRE`RE, A. (2009): «Managing Hedonic Housing Price Indexes:
The French Experience». Journal of Housing Economics 18 (3), pp. 206-213.
HAUSER, F. (1902): Madrid bajo el punto de vista me´dico-social. Madrid: Sucesores de
Rivadeneyra, 1902.
HULTEN, C. R. (2008): «Divisia index», in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 899-901.
INSTITUTO DE REFORMAS SOCIALES (1920): Preparacio´n de las bases para un proyecto de Ley
de casas para obreros. Madrid: Minuesa.
INSTITUTO DE REFORMAS SOCIALES (1921): Anteproyecto de reforma de la Ley de 12 de junio de
1911 relativa a construccio´n de casas baratas. Madrid: Minuesa.
JAFFE, A. J., and LOUZIOTIS, D. JR (1996): «Property Rights and Economic Efficiency: A
Survey of Institutional Factors». Journal of Real Estate Literature 4, pp. 137-159.
JIMENEZ, E. (1984): «Tenure security and urban squatting». Review of Economics and
Statistics 66 (2), pp. 556-567.
MALPEZZI, S. (1999): «Economic Analysis of Housing Markets in Developing and
Transition Economies», in P. C. Cheshire and E. S. Mills (eds), Handbook of Regional
and Urban Economics, vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1791-1864.
SPANISH HOUSING MARKETS, 1904-1934
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 147
MARTI´N ACEN˜A, P. (1985): «Desarrollo y modernizacio´n del sistema financiero, 1844-
1935», in N. Sa´nchez-Albornoz (ed.), La modernizacio´n econo´mica de Espan˜a
1830-1930. Madrid: Alianza Universidad, pp. 121-146.
MARTI´NEZ ALCUBILLA, M. (1892-1894): Diccionario de la administracio´n espan˜ola:
compilacio´n de la novı´sima legislacio´n de Espan˜a peninsular y ultramarina en
todos los ramos de la administracio´n pu´blica. Madrid: Ministerio de Gracia
y Justicia.
NUN˜EZ GRANE´S, P. (1920): El problema de la urbanizacio´n del extrarradio de dicha Villa
desde los puntos de vista te´cnico, econo´mico, administrativo y legal. Madrid:
Ayuntamiento de Madrid.
ORTEGO, P. (2006): Las Casas Baratas. La obra del Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Madrid:
IUSTEL, 2006.
PE´REZ MOREDA, V. (1985): «La poblacio´n espan˜ola en el siglo xix y el primer tercio del XX
(Limitaciones y cronologı´a de la modernizacio´n demogra´fica en Espan˜a)», in
N. Sa´nchez-Albornoz (ed.), La modernizacio´n econo´mica de Espan˜a 1830-1930.
Madrid: Alianza Universidad, pp. 121-146.
PESET, M. (1978): «Los orı´genes del registro de la propiedad en Espan˜a». Revista crı´tica
de derecho inmobiliario 527, pp. 695-716.
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. (2003): El progreso de Espan˜a, 1850-2000. Madrid: Fundacio´n
BBVA.
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L., and ROSE´S, J. R. (2009): «The Sources of Long-Run Growth in
Spain 1850-2000». Journal of Economic History 69 (4), pp. 1063-1091.
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L., and ROSE´S, J. R. (2010): «Long-Run Estimates of
Physical Capital in Spain, 1850-2000». Research in Economic History 27,
pp. 141-200.
REHER, D. S. (1986): «Desarrollo urbano y evolucio´n de la poblacio´n: Espan˜a 1787-
1930». Revista de Historia Econo´mica 4 (1), pp. 39-66.
RODRI´GUEZ CHUMILLAS, I. (1989): «La propiedad Inmobiliaria en Madrid: 1870-1890»,
in A. Bahamonde and L. Otero (eds), La sociedad madrilen˜a durante la Restauracio´n,
1876-1931. Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid, pp. 175-180.
ROSE´S, J. R.; MARTINEZ-GALARRAGA, J., and TIRADO, D. A. (2010): «The Upswing of Regional
Income Inequality in Spain (1860-1930)». Explorations in Economic History 47 (2),
pp. 244-257.
ROSE´S, J. R., and SA´NCHEZ-ALONSO, B. (2004): «Regional Wage Convergence in Spain
1850-1930». Explorations in Economic History 41 (4), pp. 404-425.
SILVESTRE, J. (2005): «Internal migrations in Spain, 1877 1930». European Review of
Economic History 9 (2), pp. 233-265.
SORRIBES MONRABAL, J. (1992): «La transicio´n urbana: me´todo y resultados. Valencia
1874-1931», in J. L. Garcı´a Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernizacio´n de
Espan˜a. Los decenios interseculares. Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 197-222.
TAFUNELL, X. (1992): «La construccio´n en Barcelona, 1860-1935: continuidad y cambio»,
in J. L. Garcı´a Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernizacio´n de Espan˜a. Los
decenios interseculares. Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 3-20.
TAFUNELL, X. (2005): «Urbanizacio´n y vivienda», in A. Carreras and X. Tafunell (eds),
Estadı´sticas histo´ricas de Espan˜a: siglo XIX-XX, vol. 1. Madrid: Fundacio´n BBVA,
pp. 455-499.
TRIPLETT, J. (2006): Handbook on Hedonic Indexes and Quality Adjustments in Price
Indexes: Special Application to Information Technology Products. Paris: OECD.
WILLIAMSON, J. G. (1990): Coping with City Growth During the British Industrial
Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
JUAN CARMONA PIDAL/MARKUS LAMPE/JOAN R. ROSE´S
148 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
WILLIAMSON, J. G. (1994): «Coping with City Growth», in R. Floud and D. N. McCloskey
(eds), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700-1870, vol. 1, 2nd edn. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 332-356.
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
New York: Free Press.
APPENDIX INDICES OF SPANISH HOUSING PRICES
TABLE A1
SPANISH HOUSING PRICES, 1904-34 (19045100)
Market transactions Non-market transactions
Nominal Real Hedonic Nominal Real Hedonic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1904 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1905 91.40 94.94 94.43 106.93 108.25 110.00
1906 96.97 103.23 101.10 105.78 107.99 112.71
1907 89.24 95.57 94.76 108.18 108.93 113.40
1908 93.50 99.76 98.50 105.98 109.52 116.49
1909 92.03 101.07 101.14 91.65 106.01 115.27
1910 91.01 100.48 100.93 87.24 101.06 112.35
1911 90.44 95.09 95.07 89.40 92.49 104.56
1912 99.54 101.79 101.49 96.38 99.75 113.58
1913 98.52 101.70 100.85 100.38 99.65 114.50
1914 95.84 95.74 94.67 98.13 94.80 109.43
1915 90.99 81.11 81.85 98.60 90.45 107.05
1916 94.81 80.69 80.76 110.28 90.79 105.61
1917 114.48 85.36 84.89 98.45 73.15 88.66
1918 145.30 95.68 92.38 105.76 72.70 89.43
1919 159.66 99.45 96.39 107.49 67.58 85.19
1920 183.67 108.70 104.78 102.24 59.31 74.47
1921 141.22 84.98 81.86 119.48 69.80 88.35
1922 142.22 85.24 82.68 119.15 71.57 88.53
1923 146.11 88.67 84.89 127.88 75.93 93.22
1924 143.88 86.83 85.37 137.39 83.04 102.53
1925 169.16 100.30 97.08 129.71 79.04 99.99
1926 165.55 99.07 98.31 155.31 94.48 118.94
1927 151.69 96.02 93.37 134.76 83.21 109.11
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TABLE A1 (Cont.)
Market transactions Non-market transactions
Nominal Real Hedonic Nominal Real Hedonic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1928 140.41 86.51 82.14 122.57 72.34 91.33
1929 158.78 93.97 82.69 137.08 84.68 103.00
1930 197.29 119.84 110.21 166.30 96.43 115.47
1931 199.37 119.16 107.30 210.53 118.74 128.68
1932 160.78 103.07 95.48 213.56 122.35 130.38
1933 161.63 107.15 98.30 236.45 137.95 141.49
1934 227.35 141.93 121.65 247.96 139.74 133.86
Notes and sources: See Figure 1 and text.
FIGURE A1
COMPARISON OF REAL AND HEDONIC PRICE INDICES FOR MARKET TRANS-
ACTIONS (PRICE PAID) AND NON-MARKET TRANSACTIONS (NO PRICE PAID),
1904-1934 (19005 100)
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